GoDaddy Inc. GDDY
GoDaddy remains a hold as the fundamental story—FY2025 revenue of $4.95B growing 8.26% with operating margin expansion to 22.99% and $1.58B in free cash flow—supports a deeply discounted valuation at a P/E of 13.58 versus a peer median of 29.55. However, multiple securities class action investigations announced August 13–16, 2026 alleging materially misleading business information, combined with persistent insider selling by the CEO, CFO, and Chief Accounting Officer, create an overhang that offsets the cheap multiple.
Net income has declined for two consecutive years despite operating income more than doubling from FY2022 to FY2025, reflecting the drag from $3.86B in total debt against just $215M in stockholders' equity, and the stock at $92.37 still sits below its 200-day moving average of $98.44. Patience is warranted until the legal situation clarifies and the revenue trajectory stabilizes.
What could go wrong
- Securities class action overhang. Multiple law firms (Rosen, Kaplan Fox) announced investigations August 13–16, 2026 into allegations of materially misleading disclosures; outcomes could include settlements, fines, or reputational damage.
- Leveraged balance sheet. Total debt of $3.86B against stockholders' equity of just $215M as of FY2025 creates financial fragility and explains the divergence between operating income growth and declining net income.
- Persistent insider selling. Over the 24-month window, insiders executed 78 dispositions versus 24 acquisitions with net value of -$31.4M; CEO, CFO, and CAO all sold shares in June–August 2026.
- Revenue guidance disappointment. The prior verdict noted a 21.1% single-day plunge on July 31, 2026 after a disappointing revenue outlook despite a Q2 earnings beat, signaling sensitivity to forward expectations.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: FMP FY2025 annual + derived_metrics · FMP FY2025 annual + derived_metrics · peer_relative as of 2026-08-17 · FMP annual fundamentals FY2023–FY2025. Orin's read on GDDY; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-23 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All GDDY filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Ameriprise Financial | $1.0B | 0.2% of fund |
| Vanguard Capital Management | $735.1M | 0.0% of fund |
| Vanguard Portfolio Management | $589.2M | 0.0% of fund |
| Morgan Stanley | $492.9M | 0.0% of fund |
| State Street | $443.3M | 0.0% of fund |
| Fmr | $406.7M | 0.0% of fund |
81 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 112 Form 4 filings, net −$33.8M. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 34 sales— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about GDDY
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Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 14.2× | 29.8× | 53.3× |
| EV/EBITDA | 11.0× | 25.5× | — |
| P/S | 2.50× | 3.70× | — |
Its P/E sits 20th percentile of its own last 5 years (−1.02σ from its own mean).
-4.9%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $1.6B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$90
$76 – $100 · −8% against today's price
- 22 buy or overweight
- 14 hold
- 2 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDDYGoDaddy Inc. | $13B | 14.2× | 11.0× | 63.8% | 17.8% | 661% |
| CPAYCorpay, Inc. | $26B | 23.7× | 13.7× | 73.3% | 22.7% | 30% |
| FFIVF5, Inc. | $26B | 35.9× | 25.3× | 82.2% | 22.0% | 20% |
| GENGen Digital Inc. | $16B | 15.1× | 10.1× | 78.0% | 20.7% | 42% |
| ITGartner, Inc. | $12B | 16.0× | 10.3× | 68.9% | 12.0% | 401% |
| JJacobs Solutions Inc. | $17B | 49.2× | 21.6× | 22.1% | 2.4% | 10% |
| NTNXNutanix, Inc. | $19B | 12.5× | 48.9× | 86.8% | 52.8% | -396% |
| VRSNVeriSign, Inc. | $27B | 31.8× | 23.3× | 88.5% | 49.8% | -39% |
The median is of the 7 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 40.3% below it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $201 | $81.10 · +148% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $286 | $81.10 · +253% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.