Genuine Parts Company GPC
Genuine Parts' FY2025 results (year ended 2025-12-31) show severe profitability deterioration—net income collapsed 92.7% to $65.9M from $904M in FY2024, EPS fell to $0.47 from $6.47, and total debt surged 44% to $8.27B even as revenue grew 3.5% to $24.3B. The stock has nonetheless rallied to $137.51 as of 2026-08-28, trading above both its 50-day ($126.50) and 200-day ($119.61) moving averages following a golden cross, with institutional buyers including BNY Mellon adding a new $92.9M stake in Q2 2026.
With EV/EBITDA at 34.0x versus a peer median of 12.1x and operating margin compressed to 5.0% from 6.1%, the market is pricing in a margin recovery not yet visible in reported full-year results, keeping the risk/reward balanced.
What could go wrong
- Margin non-recovery. FY2025 operating margin fell to 5.0% and net margin to 0.27% from 3.85% in FY2024; if these do not stabilize or reverse, the stock's rally from ~$104 in May to $137.51 unwinds quickly.
- Debt burden. Total debt rose to $8.27B at FY2025-end from $5.74B in FY2024 against stockholders' equity of $4.42B, materially increasing financial leverage and interest costs.
- Valuation stretched on earnings. P/E of 528.9x and EV/EBITDA of 34.0x are far above peer medians of 19.2x and 12.1x respectively, leaving no room for disappointment if recovery expectations embedded in the rally prove optimistic.
- Insider selling pattern. Over the trailing 24 months insiders net disposed of $11.1M in value despite positive net share count; recent transactions in June–August 2026 were predominantly small open-market sales (code S and F) with no cluster buying.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: FMP annual fundamentals + derived_metrics, FY2025 vs FY2024 · FMP annual fundamentals, FY2025 and FY2024 · derived_metrics, FY2025 revenue_growth_yoy 0.0346; FMP annual revenue $24,300,141,000 · derived_metrics, FY2025 and FY2024 operating_margin. Orin's read on GPC; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-24 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All GPC filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Vanguard Capital Management | $1.1B | 0.0% of fund |
| State Street | $908.0M | 0.0% of fund |
| Vanguard Portfolio Management | $730.2M | 0.0% of fund |
| Geode Capital Management | $458.4M | 0.0% of fund |
| Harris Associates L P | $431.1M | 0.6% of fund |
| Charles Schwab Investment Management | $367.2M | 0.0% of fund |
92 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 140 Form 4 filings, net −$11.1M. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 4 sales— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about GPC
Orin answers questions about GPC from its filings, transcripts and numbers — with the source behind every claim. Your own desk starts with 3 free days, card required.
Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 497.2× | 20.8× | 79.6× |
| EV/EBITDA | 32.5× | 14.1× | — |
| P/S | 0.71× | 0.84× | — |
| P/B | 3.9× | 4.4× | — |
Its P/E sits above all 5 of the last 5 years (+4.48σ from its own mean).
17.9%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $0.4B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$146
$122 – $170 · +13% against today's price
- 10 buy or overweight
- 12 hold
- 1 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPCGenuine Parts Company | $18B | 497.2× | 32.5× | 36.2% | 0.1% | 1% |
| AMCRAmcor plc | $19B | 17.6× | 9.9× | 20.0% | 4.7% | 9% |
| BBYBest Buy Co., Inc. | $19B | 15.1× | 8.2× | 22.7% | 3.0% | 43% |
| CASYCasey's General Stores, Inc. | $22B | 28.7× | 16.9× | 23.8% | 4.1% | 20% |
| LULULululemon Athletica Inc. | $12B | 8.4× | 4.8× | 56.1% | 12.8% | 30% |
| PKGPackaging Corporation of America | $21B | 30.8× | 13.6× | 20.1% | 7.2% | 15% |
| ULTAUlta Beauty, Inc. | $24B | 19.9× | 13.4× | 39.3% | 9.3% | 45% |
The median is of the 6 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 2549.1% above it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $133 | $99.03 · +34% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $107 | $99.03 · +8% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.