Las Vegas Sands Corp. LVS
LVS continues its post-COVID earnings recovery — FY2025 revenue reached $13.0B with $3.09B operating income and $1.78B FCF, and Q2 2026 delivered $3.15B revenue with $1.12B adjusted property EBITDA — yet the stock trades at a steep discount to peers (9.0x EV/EBITDA vs. 14.2x median, 2.2x P/S vs. 3.6x median), reflecting legitimate concern over an extreme ~10:1 debt-to-equity ratio with equity having shrunk from $4.12B (2023) to $1.59B (2025) even as the business recovered. Management is aggressively returning capital — $787M repurchased in Q2 2026 alone with authorization raised to $6.0B — which compounds balance-sheet fragility if Macau faces another disruption.
The stock remains in a confirmed downtrend at $45.77, 18% below the 200-day MA, with insiders net selling $341M over 24 months. The fundamental recovery and valuation are compelling, but leverage, eroding equity, and technical weakness argue for patience until deleveraging and price stabilization are evident.
What could go wrong
- Balance-sheet fragility. Total debt of $16.1B against just $1.59B stockholders' equity (~10:1), with equity shrinking from $4.12B in 2023 due to aggressive buybacks — minimal cushion against a Macau downturn.
- Macau regulatory/geopolitical risk. Core earnings depend on Macau operations; any tightening of gaming regulations, visa restrictions, or US-China tensions could materially impair revenue.
- Buybacks at the expense of deleveraging. $787M repurchased in Q2 2026 with authorization increased to $6.0B, prioritizing shareholder returns over debt reduction while equity is already thin.
- Technical downtrend. Stock at $45.77 is 7% below the 50-day MA ($47.37) and 18% below the 200-day MA ($55.60), with MACD histogram negative and RSI at 43.5 — no stabilization signal yet.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: FMP FY2025 annual · FMP fundamentals 3-year · Q2 2026 earnings release (PRNewsWire 2026-07-22) · Q2 2026 earnings release (PRNewsWire 2026-07-22). Orin's read on LVS; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-23 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All LVS filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Vanguard Capital Management | $898.2M | 0.0% of fund |
| Vanguard Portfolio Management | $861.2M | 0.0% of fund |
| State Street | $700.2M | 0.0% of fund |
| Price T Rowe Associates /Md/ | $516.6M | 0.1% of fund |
| D. E. Shaw & | $418.1M | 0.2% of fund |
| Invesco | $408.8M | 0.0% of fund |
85 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 136 Form 4 filings, net −$341.1M. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 2 sales— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about LVS
Orin answers questions about LVS from its filings, transcripts and numbers — with the source behind every claim. Your own desk starts with 3 free days, card required.
Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 15.2× | — | 79.6× |
| EV/EBITDA | 8.1× | 12.7× | — |
| P/S | 1.85× | 3.62× | — |
| P/B | 44.6× | 13.1× | — |
Its P/E sits 20th percentile of its own last 5 years (+0.01σ from its own mean).
3.1%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $1.8B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$60
$52 – $65 · +54% against today's price
- 29 buy or overweight
- 20 hold
- 0 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LVSLas Vegas Sands Corp. | $25B | 15.2× | 8.1× | 50.9% | 12.8% | 142% |
| CCLCarnival Corporation & plc | $30B | 9.4× | 7.5× | 34.4% | 11.2% | 24% |
| CMGChipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. | $42B | 30.0× | 20.7× | 24.1% | 11.4% | 53% |
| CPRTCopart, Inc. | $27B | 18.5× | 12.1× | 44.7% | 31.8% | 16% |
| DHID.R. Horton, Inc. | $39B | 13.3× | 10.8× | 22.6% | 9.2% | 13% |
| EBAYeBay Inc. | $48B | 22.1× | 17.6× | 72.5% | 18.5% | 48% |
| YUMYum! Brands, Inc. | $39B | 17.6× | 17.5× | 45.8% | 25.4% | -30% |
The median is of the 6 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 15.8% below it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $64 | $50.70 · +26% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $-48 | $50.70 · −194% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.