3M Company MMM
3M's turnaround is advancing on cash and balance-sheet repair—FY2025 free cash flow more than doubled to $1.40B from $638M and total debt fell to $12.94B—but profitability continues to erode, with operating margin compressing from 20.07% to 18.29% and EPS declining 20.5% to $6.00. At 30.8x trailing earnings, a 9.4% premium to the peer median of 28.2x, the stock prices in a margin recovery that has yet to arrive, while Consumer-segment softness and PFAS exit costs persist as headwinds.
The raised FY2026 outlook and Safety & Industrial momentum are encouraging, and the pullback to $174.34 from $182.65 modestly improves the entry, but confirmation of margin expansion in upcoming quarterly prints is needed before turning more constructive.
What could go wrong
- Margin deterioration continues. Operating margin already contracted from 20.07% to 18.29% and gross margin from 41.02% to 39.55%; further compression would undermine the turnaround thesis.
- Consumer segment weakness. Recent news highlights soft retail demand and muted hardline spending in the Consumer unit; if weakness spreads to Safety & Industrial, revenue growth of 1.52% could stall.
- PFAS and legal cost overhang. Ongoing PFAS exit costs and litigation expenses could consume cash flow; a controversial expert-witness case adds reputational risk.
- Valuation premium with declining earnings. At 30.8x P/E versus the peer median of 28.2x, there is limited room for multiple expansion if earnings disappoint.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: FMP annuals FY2025 FCF $1,396M; FY2024 FCF $638M · FMP annuals FY2025 total debt $12,936M vs FY2024 $13,659M · derived_metrics FY2024 0.2007, FY2025 0.1829 · derived_metrics FY2025 eps_growth_yoy -0.2053; fundamentals FY2025 eps_diluted $6.00. Orin's read on MMM; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-23 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All MMM filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Jpmorgan Chase & | $6.4B | 0.4% of fund |
| Vanguard Capital Management | $5.5B | 0.1% of fund |
| State Street | $4.5B | 0.1% of fund |
| Geode Capital Management | $1.9B | 0.1% of fund |
| Vanguard Portfolio Management | $1.5B | 0.1% of fund |
| Capital World Investors | $1.4B | 0.2% of fund |
130 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 244 Form 4 filings, net $49.5M. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 13 sales— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about MMM
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Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 30.1× | — | 44.5× |
| EV/EBITDA | 17.9× | — | — |
| P/S | 3.49× | 2.43× | — |
| P/B | 30.3× | 10.5× | — |
Its P/E sits above all 5 of the last 5 years (+1.63σ from its own mean).
23.4%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $1.4B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$185
$145 – $218 · +9% against today's price
- 16 buy or overweight
- 15 hold
- 2 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MMM3M Company | $88B | 30.1× | 17.9× | 39.4% | 11.9% | 77% |
| EMREmerson Electric Co. | $87B | 33.7× | 19.1× | 53.2% | 13.8% | 13% |
| GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation | $93B | 20.6× | 15.2× | 15.4% | 8.2% | 17% |
| HONHoneywell International Inc. | $67B | 8.2× | 7.4× | 36.6% | 22.7% | 42% |
| HWMHowmet Aerospace Inc. | $92B | 49.0× | 34.7× | 34.4% | 20.5% | 34% |
| ITWIllinois Tool Works Inc. | $79B | 24.7× | 18.9× | 44.2% | 19.4% | 102% |
| NOCNorthrop Grumman Corporation | $73B | 16.3× | 11.7× | 20.1% | 10.5% | 27% |
| PHParker-Hannifin Corporation | $122B | 33.6× | 22.5× | 37.7% | 17.0% | 25% |
| TTTrane Technologies plc | $96B | 33.0× | 22.9× | 35.4% | 13.3% | 34% |
| UPSUnited Parcel Service, Inc. | $81B | 17.8× | 9.9× | 16.6% | 5.1% | 29% |
| WMWaste Management, Inc. | $83B | 29.3× | 14.1× | 35.0% | 11.1% | 29% |
The median is of the 10 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 11.3% above it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $35 | $157.44 · −78% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $59 | $157.44 · −63% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.