Monster Beverage Corporation MNST
Monster Beverage is delivering exceptional fundamental performance — Q2 2026 revenue of $2.54B grew 20.2% YoY, FY2025 gross margin expanded to 55.85%, and the balance sheet carries zero debt with $1.97B in free cash flow — but the stock's 41.3x trailing PE (28.7% above the peer median of 32.1x) and 9.5x price-to-sales (381% above the peer median of 1.98x) already reflect much of this growth trajectory. The 2-for-1 stock split completed August 11, 2026 has likely distorted technical indicators, with the RSI at 19.1 and the $44.99 close sitting well below the 50-day MA of $77.41 and 200-day MA of $78.87, making the apparent oversold condition unreliable as an entry signal.
Net insider selling of approximately 963K shares ($108.5M) over 24 months and a neutral smart money score of -0.0087 as of the quarter ended 2026-06-30 temper enthusiasm despite strong operating momentum and consistent earnings beats.
What could go wrong
- Valuation compression. At 41.3x PE and 9.5x PS — premiums of 28.7% and 381% to peer medians — any growth deceleration could trigger multiple contraction with limited downside protection.
- Split-distorted technicals. The 2-for-1 split on August 11, 2026 likely renders the 50-day MA ($77.41) and 200-day MA ($78.87) unadjusted, creating a false bearish signal; RSI of 19.1 may also be an artifact.
- Persistent insider selling. Net insider dispositions of ~963K shares ($108.5M) over 24 months with no cluster buying; the EMEA CEO sold 19,000 shares at $90.90 on June 10, 2026.
- Cost pressure on margins. Recent news flags rising cost pressures and pricing actions as key watchpoints; gross margin, while improved to 55.85% in FY2025, could face headwinds if input costs accelerate.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: quarterly_results, Q2 2026 (period ended 2026-06-30) · fundamentals and derived_metrics, FY2025 (period ended 2025-12-31) · peer_relative composite · technicals as of 2026-09-01. Orin's read on MNST; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-23 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All MNST filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Vanguard Capital Management | $4.4B | 0.1% of fund |
| State Street | $3.5B | 0.1% of fund |
| Invesco | $3.1B | 0.2% of fund |
| Jpmorgan Chase & | $2.9B | 0.2% of fund |
| Geode Capital Management | $2.0B | 0.1% of fund |
| Alliancebernstein L.P | $2.0B | 0.6% of fund |
105 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 196 Form 4 filings, net −$108.9M. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 1 a sale— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about MNST
Orin answers questions about MNST from its filings, transcripts and numbers — with the source behind every claim. Your own desk starts with 3 free days, card required.
Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 40.3× | 36.9× | 38.3× |
| EV/EBITDA | 28.1× | 27.9× | — |
| P/S | 9.32× | 8.47× | — |
| P/B | 9.2× | 7.7× | — |
Its P/E sits 80th percentile of its own last 5 years (+0.50σ from its own mean).
18.3%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $2.0B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$98
$90 – $105 · +122% against today's price
- 23 buy or overweight
- 18 hold
- 3 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MNSTMonster Beverage Corporation | $86B | 40.3× | 28.1× | 55.5% | 23.1% | 25% |
| CLColgate-Palmolive Company | $69B | 33.8× | 19.6× | 60.4% | 9.7% | 631% |
| KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc. | $43B | 31.9× | 21.0× | 49.4% | 7.1% | 6% |
| KRThe Kroger Co. | $35B | 30.8× | 10.8× | 23.1% | 0.7% | 17% |
| MDLZMondelez International, Inc. | $78B | 22.6× | 16.0× | 31.1% | 8.9% | 13% |
| TGTTarget Corporation | $71B | 16.1× | 9.9× | 29.3% | 4.1% | 27% |
The median is of the 5 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 30.7% above it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $68 | $90.81 · −25% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $111 | $90.81 · +23% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.