T-Mobile US, Inc. TMUS
T-Mobile trades at 19.6x earnings — an 80% premium to the telecom peer median of 10.9x — yet the stock has sold off to $162.41, below both its 50-day ($180.24) and 200-day ($192.70) moving averages with an RSI of 31.6 signaling oversold conditions. The FY2025 gross margin collapse to 47.6% (from 63.6%) appears transient: Q1 and Q2 2026 gross profit ratios have normalized back toward the mid-60% range, and Q2 2026 EPS of $2.99 beat estimates by 15.4%.
With FY2025 free cash flow of $18.0B (FCF margin 20.4%) and revenue growth of 8.5%, the fundamental trajectory is improving, but heavy insider net selling of $1.75B over 24 months, a declining smart money score (0.03 as of Q2 2026, down from 0.13 in Q3 2025), and the upcoming CFO retirement create enough uncertainty to wait for Q3 2026 earnings on October 28 before committing.
What could go wrong
- Valuation premium compression. TMUS trades at 19.6x PE and 11.1x EV/EBITDA versus peer medians of 10.9x and 7.2x respectively; any growth deceleration could trigger multiple contraction toward peer levels.
- Gross margin volatility. FY2025 gross margin dropped to 47.6% from 63.6% in FY2024, with Q4 2025 gross profit at only $10.3B on $24.3B revenue; if this recurs it would pressure operating leverage despite revenue growth.
- Persistent insider selling. Over the trailing 24 months, insiders net sold 7.0M shares worth $1.75B across 510 transactions, with 466 dispositions versus 44 acquisitions.
- CFO transition and debt burden. CFO Osvaldik plans 2027 retirement amid $122.3B total debt as of FY2025; leadership change during a high-rate environment adds execution risk.
What would change my mind
Where this comes from: peer_relative · derived_metrics · earnings_surprises · fundamentals FY2025 / derived_metrics. Orin's read on TMUS; not advice.
Twelve months actual closes to 2026-09-23 · actual filings
50-day average 200-day average · volume below
On file
All TMUS filingsLargest holders · 13F Q2 2026
Money flow| Filer | Position | Of fund |
|---|---|---|
| Invesco | $5.3B | 0.4% of fund |
| Vanguard Capital Management | $4.9B | 0.1% of fund |
| Price T Rowe Associates /Md/ | $4.3B | 0.4% of fund |
| State Street | $4.2B | 0.1% of fund |
| Morgan Stanley | $2.4B | 0.1% of fund |
| Geode Capital Management | $2.1B | 0.1% of fund |
121 filers · quarter ended Q2 2026 · positions, not flows
Insiders, last 24 months: 513 Form 4 filings, net −$1.7B. Of the 50 on hand, 0 were open-market purchases and 11 sales— the rest are grants, option exercises and tax withholding.
Ask Orin about TMUS
Orin answers questions about TMUS from its filings, transcripts and numbers — with the source behind every claim. Your own desk starts with 3 free days, card required.
Start 3 free days →Where it trades
| Metric | Now | Own median | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 17.3× | 22.8× | 26.3× |
| EV/EBITDA | 10.3× | 11.0× | — |
| P/S | 1.93× | 2.42× | — |
| P/B | 3.2× | 2.9× | — |
Its P/E sits below all 5 of the last 5 years (−1.03σ from its own mean).
-2.0%
free-cash-flow growth every year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, is what today’s price implies — starting from $18.0B of trailing free cash flow. It is an assumption the market is making, not a forecast Orin is making.
What Wall Street published
$233
$169 – $260 · +41% against today's price
- 43 buy or overweight
- 10 hold
- 1 underweight or sell
The analysts’ consensus and their own ratings, not Orin’s. A target is a twelve-month opinion published by the firm that wrote it.
Against the companies it is compared to
| Company | Market cap | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Gross | Net | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TMUST-Mobile US, Inc. | $178B | 17.3× | 10.3× | 54.5% | 11.5% | 18% |
| CMCSAComcast Corporation | $80B | 7.3× | 4.8× | 69.4% | 9.0% | 12% |
| DISThe Walt Disney Company | $180B | 21.3× | 9.5× | 37.6% | 8.7% | 8% |
| TAT&T Inc. | $174B | 8.4× | 5.9× | 59.7% | 16.9% | 19% |
| VZVerizon Communications Inc. | $194B | 12.1× | 7.9× | 59.1% | 11.6% | 16% |
The median is of the 4 peers listed above and nothing else — check it against the column. This company trades 68.9% above it. The peer set is the vendor’s, so a company can appear here that a person would not have chosen.
What it has traded at
What its sector has traded at
Two scales, drawn separately on purpose: a sector median and one company’s multiple are not the same number and putting them on one axis invites a comparison neither series supports.
Discounted cash flow
| Model | Fair value | Against | Computed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard DCF | $394 | $184.24 · +114% | 2026-06-10 |
| Levered DCF | $171 | $184.24 · −7% | 2026-06-10 |
The vendor’s intrinsic-value models. Treat them as a low-growth anchor — for a fast grower the market routinely pays well above a DCF. These were computed against the price in the “against” column, not today’s.
Every estimate on one scale
The vertical rule is the current price. Ranges and point estimates are the backend’s, published as they were calculated; an arrow means the estimate sits beyond this scale, and its number is on the right.